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This chapter looks at the UK’s privatisation experiment, which began from the late 1970s. It 
considers the background to the UK’s privatisations, which industries were privatised and 
how, and summarises the results of studies of performance changes in privatised companies in 
the UK. It looks at the relative roles of competition, regulation and ownership changes in 
determining performance improvement. It concludes by looking at the wider lessons that 
might be learned from the UK’s privatisation experiment, including the importance of 
developing competitive markets and, in their absence, effective regulatory regimes. 
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The Labour Government of 1974-79 arranged the sale of some of the state’s 
shareholding in the petroleum company BP. However, this sale was dictated by 
budgetary pressures and did not reflect a belief within government that state industries 
should be privatised. Indeed, the same Labour Government took into state ownership 
two major industries, namely aerospace and shipbuilding. Only with the election of a 
Conservative Government in 1979, led by Margaret Thatcher, did a sea change in 
attitude occur within government towards the role of the state in the economy. 
Although it is often pointed out that the Conservative Party election manifesto in 1979 
paid little attention to what became known as ‘privatisation’, referring in the main 
simply to restoring to the private sector the two industries recently nationalised by 
labour, there was no doubting in 1979 Mrs Thatcher’s personal crusade against state 
ownership. As she writes in her memoirs: 
 
‘Privatization… was fundamental to improving Britain’s economic 
performance. But for me it was also far more than that: it was one of the central 
means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism…….. Just 
as nationalization was at the heart of the collectivist programme by which 
Labour Governments sought to remodel British society, so privatization is at the 
centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom.’ (Thatcher, 1993, 
p.676) 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the major privatisations during the 1980s and 1990s
1 
and Table 2 a summary of the amounts raised through state asset sales in the same 
period. Privatisation receipts peaked in the UK in the early 1990s. In 1997 a new 
Labour Government was elected, but despite promises when in opposition to reverse 
at least some of the privatisations, this government has continued its own, though 
much smaller-scale privatisations, especially in the form of ‘public-private 
partnerships’ (Parker and Hartley, 2003). 
 
(Tables 1 and 2 here.) 
  3 
The passage of time since the commencement of the UK’s privatisation programme in 
the early 1980s now permits a sober assessment of the results, looking at the longer-
term evidence. We start the discussion of the UK’s privatisation experiment by 
considering its main characteristics. We then turn to consider its results in terms of its 
affects on economic performance. A number of studies have been undertaken into the 
results of privatisations in the UK and we provide a summary of key studies, a 
number of which were undertaken by the author of this paper. As we shall see, the 
results confirm what we might expect from economic theory and that is that changes 
in ownership lead to performance improvements where there are appropriate changes 
in the competitive or regulatory environments. The chapter concludes by considering 
the wider lessons for economic policy of the privatisation experiment within the UK. 
 
 
Privatisation in the UK 
 
As the details in Tables 1 and 2 confirm, the UK’s privatisation experiment began 
cautiously. Unlike in a number of other countries, no ‘privatisation plan’ was 
published by government setting out a timetable for future privatisations. Rather the 
policy evolved with each seemingly successful sale – defined in terms of the 
government’s ability to sell the enterprise – triggering the planning of a further sale. 
Some privatisations were postponed for a number of years, for example British 
Airways from 1980 to 1987, in the face of difficult economic conditions for the 
airline, while others seem to have been sold quickly and opportunistically, such as 
Jaguar cars in 1984. Although government denied that the privatisations were 
determined by the need to raise annual revenues for government to support tax cuts 
and public expenditure plans, and in relation of tax and spending levels privatisation 
receipts were always small, it does not seem that generating government funds was an 
irrelevant consideration in the timing of privatisations throughout the 1980s. The 
Thatcher government set about introducing a lower tax regime in the UK from 1980 
but lacked the ability or willpower to cut public expenditure dramatically (Burton and 
Parker, 1991). Annual privatisation revenues helped fund some of the gap. At the 
                                                                                                                                            
1 A fuller listing, including 119 organisations, can be found on the HM Treasury website: www.hm-
  4same time, a fully articulated rationale for privatisation was never formally provided 
by government.  With some justification Kay and Thompson titled their early study of 
the UK’s experience in the Economic Journal in 1986, ‘Privatisation: a Policy in 
Search of a Rationale’. More recently the various studies in Parker and Saal (2003) 
illustrate the great diversity in rationales for privatisation that still exist worldwide. 
 
The first major privatisations in the UK occurred in the early 1980s and involved 
reversing the Labour Government’s nationalisations of the 1970s. British Aerospace, 
formed under state ownership from three private sector aerospace companies in 1977, 
was privatised in 1981 through an initial public offering or IPO of 51.6 per cent of the 
shares. The state enterprise that controlled the shipbuilding industry, British 
Shipbuilders, by contrast, was split up and sold off piece meal. Another high focus 
sell-off involved the state’s road-freight and storage business, the National Freight 
Corporation, which had almost gone bankrupt in the mid-1970s. This sale in 1982, 
unusually for a large privatisation, involved a management and worker buy-out. Other 
early privatisations involving IPOs included state enterprises that the public in general 
were almost certainly unaware of. Good examples were Amersham International and 
Enterprise Oil, which specialised in science-based products and North Sea oil 
production respectively. The Thatcher government also began an ambitious sale of the 
state’s stock of housing (‘council housing’), although other areas of the welfare state 
were little affected by privatisation. Privatisation of welfare services, especially health 
and education, were seen as a step too far politically. In the face of public concern that 
the Conservatives might dismantle the NHS, Mrs Thatcher repeatedly confirmed that 
‘the NHS is safe with us’ - to the undoubted disappointment of some of her supporters 
(Berry, 2002, p.2). 
 
Sell-offs took a number of forms including IPOs (mainly through offers for sale but 
some through sales by tender
2), trade sales (e.g. the sale of Rover cars formerly 
British Leyland to British Aerospace in 1988), private placements in favour of 
institutional investors and, on occasions, management and worker buy-outs (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                            
treasury.gov.uk/documents/enterprise_and_productivity/public_enterprise 
2 Under offers for sale the sale price is set and publicised in advance, whereas under sale by tender 
broadly the price is set by demand and supply during the sale. Offers for sale provide more certainty 
regarding the purchase price and therefore are more attractive to small investors. They also offer the 
best prospects for a quick capital gain on selling the shares shortly after privatisation.  
  5National Freight, some shipyards and a few coal mines). The early industry state sell-
offs involved businesses that were in competitive markets. Aerospace and 
shipbuilding, for example, faced intense international competition for orders; indeed, 
in the face of such competition the UK shipbuilding industry was in terminal decline, 
something privatisation failed to reverse. The National Freight Corporation faced 
competition from numerous smaller domestic private freight companies and while 
state owned never held more than 10 per cent of the UK market for freight and storage 
services. By contrast, a number of the major privatisations from the mid-1980s 
involved state enterprises that operated in monopoly markets, These firms are often 
referred to as ‘public utilities’ or ‘network industries’, reflecting their economies of 
scale and scope, and include telecommunications, gas, water and sewerage, electricity 
and rail transport. Previously they had been seen as ‘natural monopolies’ and 
therefore unsuitable for private ownership. 
 
Official policy on the ownership of the public utilities began to change in 1982/83. 
Telecommunications experienced fast technological change that reduced its earlier 
natural monopoly characteristics, such as optical fibre cables, new switching gear and 
wireless-based technologies. At the same time, technological change necessitated 
large-scale investment to meet the expected demands for telecommunications 
services, especially data transmission and cellular phones, which the UK government 
with its budgetary problems felt unable to meet. In 1980 British Telecom (BT) had 
been separated from the Post Office into a new ‘public corporation’ owned by 
government. In 1983 the decision was taken to privatise BT. The 1984 
Telecommunications Act led to the flotation of 50.2 per cent of BT’s shares in the 
stock market in December of that year;
 3 the remainder of the shares were sold by 
government in two further tranches, in December and July 1993. In 1983 BT had an 
entire monopoly of telecommunications services and equipment supplies within the 
UK. The provision of equipment was first opened to competition, in spite of protests 
from BT on ‘safety’ grounds, and in 1984 a new fixed-line operator was licensed, 
Mercury Communications (later fully-owned by Cable and Wireless the UK-based 
international telecommunications company, itself privatised between 1981 and 1985).  
 
  6To protect the consumer from monopoly abuse until competition developed, a new 
telecommunications regulator, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL), was 
hastily created. Initially, during the planning of BT’s privatisation, it seems that 
government intended to regulate BT using normal competition law. But in the face of 
concerns from the Office of Fair Trading (the government’s competition department) 
about the expected workload and need to build up specialist telecommunications 
regulation expertise, the decision was taken to include in the Telecommunications Bill 
provision to establish OFTEL. 
 
The BT privatisation was a success in the sense that the IPO was greatly over-
subscribed. Concerned that the London stock market might not absorb what was then 
the largest single flotation in the market’s history, the government had mounted a 
campaign, including TV and press advertising, to attract the small investor. The result 
was an outstanding success. Instead of the expected widespread public opposition to 
the privatisation of BT – in a sense the public already ‘owned’ BT as a state enterprise 
and therefore might have been expected to object to being asked to buy shares in the 
company - the public backed the sale through share buying. The outcome was a 
landmark in the UK’s privatisation experiment, for a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, the sale of BT established the principle that the public utilities could be sold-
off in spite of their size; secondly, Oftel became the regulatory model for later sector 
regulatory offices for gas (Ofgas), water and sewerage (Ofwat), electricity (Offer) and 
the railways (ORR)
4; and thirdly, the sale proved that small investors could be 
attracted if the shares were sold at a discount.
5 This helped to meet the Conservative’s 
objective of creating a share-owning democracy as a bulwark against socialism - a 
number of later privatisations included provisions that favoured small shareholders. In 
1986 British Gas was privatised, followed in 1989 by the water industry and 1990/91 
by the electricity power industry (excluding nuclear generation, which was partially 
                                                                                                                                            
3 A small percentage of shares were reserved for employees of BT. This was a model copied for a 
number of subsequent privatisations. 
4 Today Ofgas and Offer have merged to form Ofgem (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets). The 
railways now have another regulator, alongside the ORR, in the form of the Strategic Rail Authority 
(SRA). 
5 Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1983 to 1989, notes in his memoirs (Lawson, 1992, 
p.210) that the government stumbled by accident on the popularity of selling shares at a discount to the 
public when it accidentally under-priced the sale of Amersham International in 1982. 
  7privatised later, in 1996, as British Energy).
6 In all cases incentives were created for 
small investors to buy shares including loyalty share bonuses and discounts on utility 
bills. The percentage of adults holding shares consequently rose during the 1980s, 
from around 7 per cent to 25 per cent. However, small investors held only very small 
percentages of the total stock of each enterprise and the long-run trend towards 
increased institutional share ownership in the UK continued (Buckland, 1987). The 
share of the stock market accounted for by private investors fell from 28 per cent in 
1989 to under 17 per cent by 1997.  Moreover, arguably, effective corporate 
governance is better achieved by creating blocks of large shareholdings – and 
therefore investors with a large individual stake in the future of the business – rather 
than small shareholdings (for a review of the relevant literature on share ownership 
and corporate governance, see Filatotchev, 2003). It was, therefore, by no means self-
evident that promoting the small shareholder through privatisation was consistent with 
the objective of raising economic efficiency in the enterprises sold. As events 
unfolded, however, many small shareholders sold their holdings to make a quick, and 
effortless, capital gain. For example, of the 2.2m. initial shareholders in BT, some 
500,000 left the share register within six months (Ernst and Young, 1994, p.21). 
 
In 1980 inter-urban coach services were opened up to competition with some resulting 
success in terms of lower fares and improved services. However, National Express, 
originally state owned, maintained dominance in the sector assisted by its entrenched 
position operating out of Victoria coach station in London. In 1992 National Express 
was floated in the stock market. In 1985 local bus transport was also liberalised 
(except for services in London) and tenders for routes were organised.
7 The overall 
results were less positive. A number of towns faced a concentration of services on the 
profitable routes, some saw unruly competitive practices such as cutting in front of 
competitor buses to reach passengers first, and experienced other practices aimed at 
driving out rival operators. During the late 1980s many local bus services were 
privatised and, while total costs per passenger journey fell, fares rose and the long-
term trend of a decline in bus passengers continued outside of London (Fawkner, 
                                                 
6 British Energy owns eight nuclear stations excluding the older Magnox stations, which remain state-
owned. 
7 Bus services in London were put out to tender more gradually, between 1985 and 1994. 
  82003). The industry quickly consolidated 
8 and the UK competition authorities on a 
number of occasions investigated anti-competitive practices in the industry, especially 
the suspected use of predatory pricing. In 1993 the decision was taken to extend 
privatisation to the railways. The privatisation of the railways occurred between 1995 
and 1997 and has proven especially controversial. We return to rail privatisation later 
in the chapter. 
 
Across the EU, European Commission Directives have played a part in stimulating 
privatisation. Directives have required, in particular, the opening up of 
telecommunications (European Commission 96/19) and electricity power (European 
Commission 96/92) to competition. There have also been measures liberalising the 
provision of services in posts, gas and rail transport. However, because the UK has 
been a leader in privatisation (except in postal services, see below), the EU directives 
have not been the same stimulus for privatisation in the UK as they have been in some 
other parts of Europe (ed. Parker, 1998; Clifton et al., 2003). The EU directives have 
impacted in the UK in terms of harmonisation of regulatory rules across Europe rather 
than in terms of triggering state asset disposals (Daβler and Parker, 2003).  
 
 
The Results for Economic Performance 
 
There have been a number of empirical studies of the impact of UK privatisations on 
economic performance, adopting a range of performance measures to assess changes 
in allocative and productive efficiency and distributional effects. But most commonly, 
studies have concentrated on productive efficiency measuring changes in profitability, 
productivity and costs of production. Whereas profit is a useful measure of productive 
efficiency in competitive markets, its use in imperfectly competitive conditions is 
problematic because profits may reflect higher prices rather than more efficient 
production practices. For this reason, productivity and cost calculations are usually 
preferred when assessing productive efficiency in the (monopoly) public utilities. 
However, productivity measures which involve all inputs – i.e. measuring total factor 
                                                 
8 By 1999 five operators — FirstGroup PLC, Arriva PLC, Stagecoach Holdings PLC, The Go-Ahead 
Group PLC and the National Express Group PLC  - accounted for an estimated 69 per cent share of the 
local bus service market; www.researchandmarkets.com 
  9productivity with productivity gains shown as a residual - face reliability problems. 
This is because the capital input is usually difficult to measure accurately. At the same 
time, the alternative of measuring labour productivity trends may produce biased 
results due to capital for labour substitution and, where output rather than value added 
is used as the numerator, contracting-out of labour intensive services. At the same 
time, calculating efficient costs of production involves specification of a cost 
function. To overcome problems in specifying the appropriate functional form, some 
studies adopt mathematical modelling techniques including non-parametric frontier 
estimation using data envelopment analysis (DEA), which capitalises on Farrell’s 
(1957) earlier exposition of the ‘efficiency frontier’.
9 But DEA as a technique is 
sensitive to outliers and it assumes that all of the unexplained data variance results 
from inefficiency. Recently, an alternative parametric approach involving stochastic 
cost frontiers (SCF) has attracted interest, but the properties of SCF are not well 
understood and so far the method has been little used to assess the performance of 
privatisations in the UK. 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of key studies of the impact of privatisation on economic 
efficiency in the UK, detailing the author, the industry, the performance measures 
used and the main findings. Most of the studies in Table 3 have been concerned with 
productive efficiency, although some have attempted to assess wider social welfare 
impacts. Investigation of the price-cost wedge, required in allocative efficiency 
studies, is complex and requires information on a firm’s efficient costs of production 
and price-cost margins elsewhere in the economy (to address the ‘second best’ 
problem; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Where markets become more competitive after 
privatisation, it might be expected that prices would move closer to marginal costs, 
implying higher allocative efficiency. However, this depends upon the pricing 
strategy followed under state ownership. Under state ownership and constant cost 
production, a ‘break-even’ objective will lead to prices equalling marginal costs and a 
profit-maximising, unregulated, monopolist produces a lower output than a state 
enterprise with a break-even strategy. Also, in empirical studies it often proves 
difficult to separate out the effects of ownership, competition, regulation and 
                                                 
9 An extension of DEA analysis leads to Malmquist indices to reflect productivity growth. 
  10technological change on efficiency. Therefore it is often unclear how far privatisation 
rather than other factors is responsible for any economic efficiency gains achieved. 
 
(Table 3 here.) 
 
Principal-agent theory and its implications for effective corporate governance suggest 
that in privately-owned enterprises management faces superior incentives to drive out 
waste and maximise productivity (De Alessi, 1980; Bös, 1991; Boycko et al., 1996).
10 
While public choice theory maintains that within government, as elsewhere in the 
economy, self-interest is the dominant motive, with the result that state ownership is 
associated with empire building, gold plating of public investments, over-manning 
and, in general, economic waste (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1976; Mitchell, 1988). 
Together, principal-agent theory and public choice theory provide a powerful 
theoretical rationale for privatisation (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). However, 
it is far from clear that politicians are aware of the details of the two theories, 
although they may have reacted as if they did. Nor, indeed, is it obvious that 
economic theory played the dominant part in the form and timing of privatisations in 
Europe (ed. Parker, 1998). Also, a fuller economic appraisal of privatisation (e.g. Kay 
and Thompson, 1986; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Martin and Parker, 1997) 
demonstrates that if ownership change is to have reliable efficiency results then the 
roles of competition and regulation may be crucial.  
 
Turning to the studies in Table 3, a number were unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that ownership change has had no effect on economic performance.  Nor is there any 
evidence that later privatisations outperformed earlier privatisations in terms of 
raising performance, which would have been consistent with ‘learning’ effects within 
government. In a number of cases the improvements in productive efficiency recorded 
simply reflected long-run growth trends that pre-dated privatisation. In the most 
comprehensive study of UK privatisation, by Martin and Parker (1997), for example, 
no consistent relationship between ownership and performance was found. For 
example, labour productivity growth in BT and British Gas fell after privatisation, and 
recovered sharply only after both telecommunications and gas supplies were opened 
  11up to more competition; in telecommunications this occurred in the early 1990s and in 
gas during the 1990s. In both industries, at first the regulatory pressures (including the 
price caps imposed by the regulatory offices) seem to have provided generous scope 
to raise profits without major cost cutting. In the face of tightening regulation and 
more competition in the 1990s, productivity responded. The average annual rise in 
labour productivity was around 15 per cent in BT and 6 per cent in British Gas in the 
early to the mid-1990s (with lower growth in total factor productivity). Since then the 
continued growth of competition has spurred further productivity gains.  
 
The findings in Martin and Parker on the importance of competition and regulation 
are mirrored in a number of the other studies in Table 3; for example those relating to 
the electricity industry. In electricity competition was introduced at privatisation in 
1990/91 and extended to all consumers during the 1990s.
11 Burns and Weyman-Jones 
(1994) in an early study concluded that the 12 regional electricity distribution 
companies had become more efficient after privatisation, although this was a 
continuation of a longer-term trend. While a recent review of electricity generation 
found that substantial cost reductions had occurred (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997) and 
another study (Domah and Pollitt, 2001) of the performance of regional electricity 
companies in England and Wales calculates a significant gain in social welfare, but in 
both cases with gains skewed to producers (in terms of higher profits) and possibly 
government (in terms of higher tax revenues). In electricity like the other utility 
industries these efficiency increases were a reflection of the sharp reductions in 
employment achieved. Employment in the industry fell from 127,300 at privatisation 
to around 66,000 by 1996/97. Over the same period transmission operating costs fell 
by nearly 40 per cent (Financial Times, 1999). In BT employment declined from 
around 238,000 at privatisation to 124,700 by 1999, and in British Gas from about 
92,000 at privatisation to 70,000 by 1994.  
 
Turning to the water industry where there is still very little competition, Shaoul 
(1997) concluded that significant efficiency gains, defined as lower costs relative to 
output, occurred before privatisation. After privatisation, at first employment in the 
                                                                                                                                            
10 In the 1970s the term property rights theory was used but today the term principal-agent theory is 
preferred in the literature. 
11 Except in Northern Ireland, which has its own electricity system. 
  12industry rose, in  1990/91 the average number employed in the water and sewerage 
companies was 45,863. By 1993/94 this had grown to 58,270. More recently numbers 
have fallen and the water regulator’s price caps imposed in 2000 necessitated, for the 
first time, real price reductions for water and sewerage services.  What appears to 
have happened in this industry is that lax regulation at the outset plus a lack of 




In the case of all of the privatisations, results may well have been affected by 
technical change. This is particularly so in telecommunications and electricity 
generation where there have been some notable technological improvements. Changes 
in international prices, notably for fuel inputs such as oil and gas, have also been an 
important factor in the electricity sector. One way forward is to compare the 
performance of the UK utilities with those overseas and able to capitalise equally on 
the new technologies and affected by the same world price movements for key inputs. 
In this respect O’Mahony’s (1998) work on comparative productivity levels in the 
electricity, gas and water sectors in the US, France, Germany and Japan compared 
with the UK is of interest. Table 4 reproduces some of her results. It is evident that 
her calculations suggest that the labour and total factor productivity gap between the 
UK and the other countries has narrowed, but that in most cases this narrowing dates 
back to the late 1970s or before. That is to say, the catching up in comparative 
productivity pre-dates privatisation, a result consistent with the findings of some of 
the studies in Table 3. For example, Parker and Wu (1998) found that comparing the 
British steel industry with a number of other steel industries around the world, the 
relative performance of British Steel declined after privatisation. British Steel 
improved its performance sharply in the last few years under state ownership, when 
the industry was rationalised, capacity and manning cut, and the industry became 
attractive to private investors. It remains a matter of speculation whether the 
rationalisation occurred because of the imminent threat of privatisation, for which 
privatisation can take credit, or whether it simply provided the opportunity for 
                                                 
12 In the water and sewerage industry the need to raise capital investment also led to real price 
increases, see the discussion of funding needs below. Saal and Parker attempt to control for 
environmental and water quality improvements in their econometric studies of productivity and costs in 
the water sector. 
  13government to sell-off the industry.
13 Florio (2002; also see Brau and Florio, 2001 and 
Florio and Grasseni, 2003), using social-cost benefit analysis, concludes that British 
privatisations had modest effects on the efficiency of production and consumption, 
but that they did have important and regressive effects on the distribution of income 
and wealth. Overall, he concludes that there was not an unambiguous Pareto welfare 
improvement. 
 
(Table 4 here.) 
 
In most of the UK public utilities prices have fallen since privatisation reflecting gains 
in productive efficiency. The following examples are selected to reflect the general 
nature of the price changes after privatisation (a more detailed account can be found 
in Parker, 1999a, p.127). Taking telecommunications first, from 1984 to 1999 average 
real charges fell by around 48 per cent on average; although this change certainly 
results from technology and competition in addition to ownership change and 
regulation.
14 Turning to the gas sector, the next to be privatised after 
telecommunications, between 1986 and 1997 domestic gas bills fell by an average of 
2.6 per cent a year, again in real terms. After 1997 the gradual introduction of 
competition in domestic gas supplies led to further cuts of up to 20 per cent.
15 Real 
industrial and commercial gas prices fell over the same period by about 5 per cent a 
year.  
 
In the electricity market the decline in charges for domestic consumers in England 
and Wales between 1990 and 1999 was around 26 per cent in real terms for domestic 
consumers; while the reduction for industrial and commercial consumers was even 
larger, totalling between 25 and 34 per cent – see Table 5 (Littlechild, 2000, pp.32-
                                                 
13 Nigel Lawson is in no doubt that privatisation deserves the credit: ‘It was the process of preparing 
State enterprises for privatization, and the prospect of privatization, that initially enabled management 
to be strengthened and motivated, financial disciplines to be imposed and taken seriously, and costs to 
be cut as trade union attitudes changed’ (Lawson, 1992, pp.239-40). 
14 Within this average, line rental charges rose in nominal terms and remained broadly constant in real 
terms over the period. There was a sharp fall in call charges, especially long-distance and international 
charges. 
15 After the domestic market was liberalised around one in four domestic consumers switched from the 
former monopoly supplier, British Gas, to a new supplier. Similarly, by June 2000 one in four 
customers had exercised their new right to change their electricity supplier (NAO, 2001, p.1). 
  1433).
16  The main exception to this impressive track record on charging was registered 
in the water and sewerage industry. Here domestic charges rose sharply after 
privatisation, by over 40 per cent in real terms for average unmeasured water and 
sewerage bills (less for measured or metered services). The privatised water 
companies justified these increases in terms of the need to fund investments to 
modernise water and sewerage systems after years of under investment when in the 
state sector and to meet the requirements of EU water quality directives. But the scale 
of the increases may also reflect a lack of competition in water services since 
privatisation.   
 
It is also important to recognise that the above figures are averages and conceal 
disparities in the distribution of the welfare gains between different consumer groups 
(Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995; Waddams Price and Hancock, 1998; Markou 
and Waddams Price, 1999; Florio, 2002; Waddams Price and Young, 2003). State 
ownership is associated with cross-subsidies and ‘no undue discrimination’ clauses 
that lead to uniform pricing. Privatisation, especially when coupled with competition, 
can be expected to lead to prices more closely related to the marginal costs of 
supplying different user groups, provided that the removal of cross-subsidies is 
acceptable to industry regulators. In practice, in the UK regulators have accepted the 
case for removing much of the cross-subsidy, on the grounds that it distorts price 
signals; although they have sometime acted to slow down their removal to avoid 
sudden large price adjustments. The result over the longer-term has been different 
price changes for different user groups. Users with lower marginal costs, usually large 
users or industry, have tended to receive bigger reductions in charges than smaller, 
often poorer consumers, which are individually more costly to serve (NAO, 2001). 
The result is that lower income groups have received smaller welfare gains from 
privatisation, and in some cases have lost out, especially from privatisation of energy 
supplies. In this sense it has not proved possible for regulators neatly to separate the 
pursuit of economic efficiency from the social consequences of their actions (Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999, pp.80-81). This is something formally recognised in the Utilities Act 
                                                 
16 The electricity industries in Scotland and Northern Ireland are separately structured and competition 
has been less intense. In Scotland the reduction in domestic charges up to 1997 was about 7 per cent 
and in Northern Ireland a miserly 0.4 per cent. 
  152000, which enables government to give guidance to the energy market regulator to 
take account of social and environmental as well as economic outcomes. 
 
Service quality changes since privatisation are particularly difficult to summarise 
because service quality is multi-dimensional. Nevertheless, there is no substantial 
evidence that lower manning and price reductions in the public utilities have been at 
the expense of service quality;
17 while for privatised companies operating in 
competitive environments, reducing service quality to the disadvantage of consumers 
leads to a loss of market share and therefore is not usually a commercially sensible 
option. In telecommunications, gas, water services and electricity performance targets 
for service quality have been introduced by the regulator, with penalties and 
compensation payments paid to consumers where service falls below target. Over the 
years the regulators have set more exacting service standards that have delivered 
service improvements. The result is evidence of improved service quality since 
privatisation across the privatised utilities, with the notable exception of the railways 
(for a review see Parker, 1999a), to which we now turn.  
 
The privatisation of the railways in the mid-1990s involved an ambitious project to 
introduce competition by dividing the railways into an infrastructure operator, 
Railtrack (responsible for lines, signalling and major stations), 25 passenger train 
operating companies (most with monopolies of services on particular routes but with 
plans to introduce competition later – these plans were subsequently abandoned), 6 
freight service companies (three were quickly merged into one to facilitate a 
successful sale), 3 companies leasing rolling-stock (known as Roscos) and numerous 
rail maintenance businesses and other specialised activities. The result was the 
disintegration of the monopoly British Rail and the replacement of management 
control of resource use across the industry by very large numbers of legal contracts 
(Tyrrall and Parker, 2003). Few now defend the form of this privatisation and its 
resulting transaction costs and pressures have developed to reintegrate parts of the 
industry (Pollitt, 1999). The train companies were successful in raising passenger 
numbers, by over 30 per cent in four years, but this led to train overcrowding.  
                                                 
17 Perhaps the most publicised example of a decline in service quality outside of the railways occurred 
in telecommunications in 1987 when the number of functioning public telephone boxes fell sharply. 
The regulator quickly persuaded BT to increase maintenance spending. 
  16 
Although Pollitt and Smith (2002) - see Table 3 - paint a generally favourable picture 
of rail privatisation in Britain, their analysis ends in 2000 before a significant decrease 
in service reliability and the financial collapse of Railtrack. In October 2001 Railtrack 
was placed in administration.
18 The government refused to increase its funding to the 
company while it remained under private ownership. In 2002 the government replaced 
Railtrack with Network Rail, a company limited by guarantee but effectively a new 
state enterprise – although government refuses to concede that this amounts to re-
nationalisation of the rail infrastructure. What is certain is that the Ladbroke Grove, 
Hatfield and Potters Bar rail crashes between 1999 and 2002 and continuing (and in 
part consequential) delays and cancellations of train services have meant that rail 
privatisation has damaged the reputation of privatisation in general within the UK. It 
is interesting to note, however, that even in the 1980s, when the public was eagerly 
buying privatisation shares with the aim of making a quick capital gain, public 
opinion polls often recorded a majority against the policy of privatisation (Clifton et 
al., 2003, p.91).  
 
Finally, a fuller analysis of the welfare gains from privatisation needs to address the 
distribution of the economic net benefits, which seems to have been regressive in 
terms of impact on income and wealth (Florio, 2002). Certainly the City has benefited 
from accountancy, legal, consultancy and flotation fees and as an investor (TUC, 
1985a).  At least £780m. had been paid in fees and commissions by 1994 (Helm, 
1995). Also, profitability was buoyant in the privatised utilities, especially in the early 
years after privatisation. For example, the rate of return on capital employed in the 
water industry rose from an average of 9.8 per cent at privatisation in 1989 to 11.1 per 
cent by 1996/97; in electricity the increase was larger, with average returns rising 
from around 4 per cent in generation and 6.5 per cent in distribution and supply to 
around 11 per cent and 8.8 per cent respectively, between 1990/91 and 1995/96. As a 
result, and because shares were sold at attractive prices, in part to encourage small 
investors, investors benefited from large and sometimes spectacular rises in share 
                                                 
18 This High Court action meant that administrators appointed by government became responsible for 
running the company. The train operating companies have also turned to public subsidies, contrary to 
the plans for sharp year-on-year reductions in public financing at the time of privatisation. More than 
half have had to be rescued from increasing losses. The train operating companies are now benefiting 
  17values. While returns have varied, on average individual investors who bought shares 
in the privatised utilities at flotation obtained returns on their investment up to the end 
of April 1997 exceeding 10  per cent per annum in real terms.
19 The average return in 
the water sector was 24 per cent and in the electricity distribution and supply sector 
38 per cent a year. The latter figure was buoyed up by takeover bids in the mid-1990s 
for distribution and supply companies in England and Wales.
20  
 
Table 6 summarises the findings from a study of returns to investors in the privatised 
utilities, showing the returns obtained by investors if the shares were sold at the end of 
the first day of trading, after 1 year, 5 years and if the shares were still held on 30 
April 1997. The gains on the first day of trading for initial share offers underline the 
attraction of the shares to small investors keen to make a quick profit and were 
generally significantly greater than usually occurs for IPOs in the UK stock market 
(Boyfield, 199&0; Florio, 2002, p.21). Where privatisation shares were bought at 
flotation by foreign investors, there was a net welfare loss to the UK due to under-
pricing; when bought by domestic investors there was a redistribution of wealth from 
government or taxpayers to domestic shareholders. 
 
(Table 5 here.) 
 
Returns to investors in the UK following privatisation were high and it seems higher 
than government anticipated at the time of the sell-offs (otherwise presumably the 
government would have held out for a higher price for the shares at the time of their 
sale). The high profits and shareholder returns can be attributed either to the 
companies exploiting their market power in the face of lax regulation or to 
government under-estimating the scope for cost savings following privatisation. 
Opinion seems to be divided on which of these explanations is the more important, 
probably both apply (e.g. Boardman and Laurin, 1998; Dnes, et.al., 1998). What is 
clear is that the regulators have been able to respond fully only when the price caps 
                                                                                                                                            
from fewer but larger franchises and longer franchise periods. The result is to replace competition for 
franchises (‘competition for the market’) with longer-term investment incentives. 
19 May 1997 saw the election of a Labour Government. This government imposed a £5.2bn. ‘windfall 
profits’ tax on the utilities, including the privatised airport operator BAA, in an attempt to recoup some 
of the large profits made. 
20 The figures quoted are internal rates of return based on capital gains, dividends and amounts 
invested; for the method of calculation see Parker, 1997. 
  18have come up for reconsideration, at so-called ‘periodic reviews’ (although some 
regulators, notably the water regulator, intervened earlier and in the other industries 
companies were successfully cajoled from time to time not to increase their prices by 
the maximum permitted under their price cap).  Price cap reviews in the mid to late 
1990s reduced revenues to the privatised utilities, leading to significantly lower 
profitability and returns to investors closer to the cost of raising capital (or a ‘normal’ 
return). It is in no small part for this reason, for example, that the privatised electricity 
companies, which proved such a tempting target for takeovers by foreign companies 




Another obvious gainer from privatisation has been the senior management, many of 
whom kept their jobs at privatisation (Cragg and Dyck, 1999; Martin and Parker, 
1997, ch.9). The introduction of stock options and profit related bonuses has led to a 
large rise in the pay of senior management. This has led, in turn, to media and union 
criticism of privatisation’s ‘fat cats’ (e.g. TUC, 1985b). At the same time, job losses, 
de-unionisation and changes to collective bargaining in a number of privatised 
enterprises (TUC, 1986; Ferner and Colling, 1991) have produced a widening of pay 
differentials between unskilled workers and skilled workers and, of course, top 
management. Study suggests that privatisation did not lead to an obvious fall in 
average wages in privatised companies (Martin and Parker, 1996) but differentials 
have widened. There has been much variation in employment trends across privatised 
businesses and changes in pay and employment to a degree reflect wider changes in 
the UK economy.  It is worth noting that in some cases when large-scale redundancies 
occurred, e.g. BT in the early 1990s, many of those made redundant received 
generous redundancy packages. This means that in assessing the net benefits from 
privatisation, the effect on workers is particularly difficult to assess.
22 
 
A further possible gainer was government and therefore taxpayers, who substituted 
paying subsidies to and receiving future dividends from the nationalised industries, 
                                                 
21 Another, more recent factor has been the introduction of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
for wholesale power that have reduced wholesale electricity prices and therefore profitability in 
generation.  These new Arrangements were introduced in March 2001 and replaced the power pool 
introduced at privatisation and which had been subject to alleged gaming by the major generators.  
22 Also, many redundancies in privatised companies have been ‘voluntary’. 
  19for the sale price plus future taxation on any higher profits earned after privatisation. 
There is evidence that the taxpayer has been a net gainer in a number of cases (e.g. 
Domah and Pollitt, 2001), but no means all and perhaps not overall. Shaoul (2003) 
provides a financial analysis of the privatisation of the National Air Traffic Services, 
through a PPP, which suggests the government faces higher financial costs to bail out 
the failing sale. Florio (2002) concludes that public sector net wealth declined sharply 
during the years of privatisation, reflecting in part the under-pricing of assets sold. He 





Lessons from the UK’s Experience 
 
By 2004 there is little left in the industrial sector in the UK to privatise, although the 
welfare state still remains largely untouched by privatisation. Apart from some 
competitive tendering for contracts, such as for cleaning hospitals and schools, and 
isolated examples of private companies being brought in to sort out under-performing 
educational and health services, the welfare state remains solidly state provided.
24 
Recently the Government recommended greater use of private companies and private 
capital in the provision of health care, but this has met with determined opposition 
from backbench Labour MPs and public sector trade unions. 
 
The Conservative Government backed away from privatising the Post Office in 1994 
because of the potential adverse impact on rural post offices and because of the 
possible loss of uniform postal charges across the UK. Many Conservative MPs are 
elected by rural constituencies and rural areas might expect to be losers from the 
introduction of private competition. The current Labour Government has tried to 
introduce further commercialisation of the Post Office, begun under the 
Conservatives, but similarly shows no desire (or the lack of political courage) to 
privatise the post. London Underground, by contrast, is currently subject to 
restructuring that will lead to private companies becoming responsible for the 
                                                 
23 The windfall profits tax introduced by the Labour Government shortly after its election in 1997 was 
intended to recover some of the rents from asset under-pricing. 
  20infrastructure. This project is highly controversial but promoted by the Labour 
Government as an example of the benefits of public-private partnership (PPP). 
Indeed, most privatisations under Labour have taken the form of PPPs or PFIs 
(Private Finance Initiative, a close relation). The intention is to introduce the 
reputedly superior project management skills of the private sector into transport, 
defence, the NHS, education and other public services. By April 2003 564 PFI deals 
had been agreed with a capital value of £35bn. (Financial Times, 2003). However, the 
extent of the long-term cost savings to taxpayers from PPPs remains highly uncertain, 
especially since government may raise capital more cheaply than the private sector 
(Economist, 2003; Parker and Hartley, 2003).
25 Meanwhile, one major privatisation 
under Labour using a PPP, the selling-off of the Civil Aviation Authority’s National 
Air Traffic Services (NATS) mainly to a consortium of seven UK airlines, quickly ran 
into financial difficulty
26, and like the railways and British Energy (nuclear power)
27, 
has sought financial assistance from the government. 
 
So what are the lessons from the UK’s privatisation experiment for the UK and other 
countries? Firstly, the empirical evidence is consistent with economic theory and 
suggests that competition and in the absence of competition effective state regulation 
are important if privatisation is to lead to performance improvements, including lower 
prices and improved services. Ownership change on its own does not appear to have a 
significant effect in terms of improving economic performance where there is market 
dominance, especially in terms of welfare gains to consumers. Management in 
monopolies may seek an ‘easy life’ whether in the private or public sectors; while in 
private-sector monopolies management can meet investors’ expectations of profits by 
simply raising prices. Although it is dangerous to try and generalise across very 
different industries with different competitive conditions at the outset, nonetheless, in 
                                                                                                                                            
24 The 1980s and 1990s saw an expansion in private sector provision of care homes for the elderly. 
However, more recently many have closed following a tightening of state financing. 
25 The extent to which the state really does have a lower cost of capital than the private sector remains 
controversial. Critics argue that the government raises capital more cheaply only by transferring default 
risk to tazpayers who are under-compensated for the risk. 
26 NATS was privatised in 2001 and the state retains a 49 per cent shareholding and a ‘golden share’. 
Golden shares have been introduced in a number of privatisations and enable the government to protect 
the company from unwelcome takeover bids. However, in a number of cases the golden shares have 
been abandoned and recently the European Commission signalled its unhappiness at the use of golden 
shares and challenged their legality. 
27 British Energy’s problems have been exacerbated by falling wholesale electricity prices under the 
New Electricity Trading Arrangements. 
  21general the UK evidence is consistent with economic theory in making competition 
first best in terms of reliably generating economic efficiency gains, followed, in the 
absence of competition by effective regulation, and lastly privatisation. At the same 
time, however, it would be wrong to dismiss the benefits of privatisation in the UK. 
Without privatisation it is probable that competition would not have been permitted or 
would have proved more difficult to produce, for example in electricity and gas 
supplies, and regulatory systems would have remained highly politicised. In other 
words, increased competition and improved state regulation of utilities may be a 
direct product of the privatisation process. It is educational that the UK had 
experimented with various reforms for its nationalised industries in the 1960s and 
1970s in the face of poor performance, to little obvious advantage (NEDO, 1976) and 




Secondly, the UK’s utility privatisations led to very high returns to some investors, at 
least until competition or regulatory pressures became effective. This meant that in 
the early days generally investors rather than consumers were the main gainers from 
privatisation of the public utilities. ‘Stagging’ gains in the first hours of trading in the 
shares of a newly floated company are commonplace in stock markets, but the gains 
from privatisation issues in the UK seem, on average, to have been exceedingly 
generous and beyond what was needed to ensure that the flotations were a success.   
 
Thirdly, although space has precluded a full discussion of the development of 
economic regulation in the UK, and more specifically the evolution of the powers of 
the regulatory offices – Oftel, Ofgas, Ofwat, Offer and ORR - it is clear from the 
UK’s experience that where firms are privatised with considerable market dominance 
developing effective regulation takes time, but is essential. One of the UK’s main 
contributions to economic policy in recent years has involved improvements in our 
understanding of regulatory governance and the popularising of certain regulatory 
tools, most notably the price cap (Littlechild, 1983; Parker, 2002). 
 
                                                 
28 In the early 1980s the UK government attempted to encourage new entry into the electricity and gas 
markets without privatisation. The results were very disappointing in the face of the market dominance 
of the state-owned firms, who ultimately had recourse to tazpayer support. 
  22Fourthly, the enterprises that were privatised fell into no set pattern with some of the 
utilities remaining dominant in their sectors (for example, in spite of competition and 
regulation BT still accounts for around 70 per cent of domestic residential and 60 per 
cent of all business calls within the UK)
29 and others (e.g. Amersham International) 
becoming indistinguishable from other private sector companies. The result is an 
industrial structure involving both monopolistic and competitive privatised 
companies. The supervision of privatised markets falls increasingly to the competition 
authorities, in the UK notably the Competition Commission, both to ensure alongside 
industry regulators that competition develops where it is absent, and to protect 
competition once it has been established. A further lesson from the UK’s experience 
emphasises the importance of parallel developments in competition policy to police 
the privatised markets effectively to prevent monopoly abuse and to encourage new 
market entry. The UK strengthened its competition laws in 1998 with the Competition 
Act and in 2002 with the Enterprise Act. This legislation has increased the powers of 
the competition authorities to investigate and penalise collusive behaviour between 
companies and abuses of market power that lead to a substantial lessening of 
competition. Privatisation has not led to the withering away of the state, but rather to a 
reformulated role for government as a market regulator rather than a direct service 
provider (cf. Cook, 1998; Saal, 2003, p.578). 
 
Finally, the UK’s experiment with privatisation came after decades of relative 
economic decline. The election of Mrs Thatcher occurred because of growing public 
discontent with poor economic growth, rising inflation, growing unemployment and 
poor labour relations in the UK. Privatisation has not proved to be an economic 
miracle. But as part of the wider restructuring of the economy that occurred in the 
1980s, involving tax cuts, public spending caps, trade union reform and the closure of 
declining industries, it has contributed to reversing the perception of the UK as ‘the 
sick man of Europe’ – albeit that the UK’s GDP growth rate has not noticeably 
increased as a result. In particular, privatisation has played an important part in 
reducing the burden of the state in the UK economy. Whereas in 1979 nationalised 
industries accounted for 10.5 per cent of GDP, by 1993 the figure had fallen to 3 per 
cent and public sector employment fell by 1.5 million as a result of the sale of the 
                                                 
29 The figures are lower for international calls (residential 58.6 per cent and business 40 per cent). For a 
  23industries (Talbot, 2001, p.288). Whereas the precise economic effects of UK 
privatisation remain uncertain and will continue to debated, as part of the wider 




                                                                                                                                            
detailed breakdown, see Oftel (2002, p.10). 
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Date of sale 
(where more than one date is 
given the shares were sold in 
tranches) 
 
British Petroleum  October 1979 
September 1983 
November 1987 
British Aerospace  February 1981 
May 1985 
Cable & Wireless  October 1981 
December 1983 
December 1985 
Amersham International  February 1982 





Associated British Port Holdings  February 1983 
April 1984 
Enterprise Oil  July 1984 
Jaguar August  1984 
British Telecommunications  December 1984 
December 1991 
July 1993 








British Airways  February 1987 
Rolls-Royce May  1987 
BAA (British Airports Authority)  July 1987 
British Steel  December 1988 
Anglian Water  December 1989 
Northumbrian Water  December 1989 
North West Water  December 1989 
Severn Trent  December 1989 
Southern Water  December 1989 
South West Water  December 1989 
Thames Water  December 1989 
Welsh Water  December 1989 
Wessex Water  December 1989 
Yorkshire Water  December 1989 
Eastern Electricity  December 1990 
East Midlands Electricity  December 1990 
London Electricity  December 1990 
Manweb December  1990 
Midlands Electricity  December 1990 
  31Northern Electric  December 1990 
NORWEB December  1990 
SEEBOARD December  1990 
Southern Electric  December 1990 
South Wales Electricity  December 1990 
South Western Electricity  December 1990 
Yorkshire Electricity  December 1990 
National Power  March 1991 
PowerGen March  1995 
Scottish Hydro-Electric  June 1991 
Scottish Power  June 1991 
Trust Ports  1992-97 (various dates) 
Northern Ireland Electricity  June 1993 
British Coal  December 1994 
Railtrack May  1996 
British Energy  July 1996 
AEA Technology  September 1996 
Train Operating Companies  Various dates in 1996/7 






  32Table 2: UK Privatisation Receipts: 1979-2000 (£bn.) 
 
 
1977/78       0.5 
1978/79       0.0 
1979/80            0.4 
1980/91       0.2 
1981/82       0.5 
1982/83       0.5 
1983/84       1.1 
1984/85       2.1 
1985/86       2.7 
1986/87       4.5 
1987/88       5.1 
1988/89       7.1 
1989/90       4.2 
1990/91       5.3 
1991/92       7.9 
1992/93       8.2 
1993/94       5.4 
1994/95       6.4 
1995/96       3.0 
1996.97       4.4 
1997/98       1.8 
1998/99       0.1 
 
 
Note: figures exclude council housing receipts and receipts of subsidiaries retained by 
the parent. The figures after 1998/99 are negligible. 
 
Sources:  HM Treasury, The Financial Statement and Budget Report (various).
  33Table 3: UK Privatisation: Performance Studies 
 
 
Author(s)  Industry(s)  Main Performance Measures 
Used 
Findings 
Hutchinson (1991)  17 UK firms in several 
industrial groupings 
Labour productivity, 




owned firms in the 1970s and 
1980s in terms of profitability 
only.  Less certain whether 
privatisation had improved 
performance. 
 
Bishop and Thompson (1992)  9 privatised enterprises across a 
range of UK industries; 
including BT, British Gas and 
electricity supply 
Labour productivity and TFP, 
1970-80 compared with 1980-
90 
There was higher growth in 
labour productivity in BT but 
the growth in TFP fell in the 
1980s.  In British Gas labour 
productivity grew at the same 
rate in the 1970s as the 1980s, 
while the growth of TFP 
declined.  Electricity supply 
saw a fall in both labour 
productivity and TFP growth. 
Haskel and Szymanski (1993)  12 privatised firms between 
1972 and 1988, including BT, 
British gas, electricity supply 
and water 
Estimates of productivity 
growth (output per employee) 
In the main productivity has 
grown faster in the 1980s.  
Competition is the significant 
causal factor. 
  34Burns and Weyman-Jones 
(1994) 
Electricity distribution  Multiple input, multiple output 




The 12 electricity distribution 
companies have been more 
efficient since privatisation, but 
this continues a long-term 
historical trend.  There is also a 
greater diversity of 
performance amongst the 12 
since privatisation. 
Parker (1994)  British Telecom (BT) 1979/80 
to 1993/94 
Productivity and employment 
costs in total costs. R&D 
expenditures 
Labour productivity grown 
faster since privatisation, but 
the record for TFP is much less 
impressive.  Employment costs 
have declined as a percentage 
of all costs, continuing a trend 
that dates back to before 
privatisation. R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of 
turnover have fallen, but this 
result is difficult to interpret 
because it may reflect a more 
efficient use of resources. 
Bishop and Green (1995)  6 privatised enterprises 
including British Gas and BT 
TFP and financial data 1989-94  Competition rather than 
ownership is important.  
Growth in TFP in BT was in 
part due to technical change. 
Waddams Price and Weyman-
Jones (1996) 
Gas industry, 1977/78 to 1991  Malmquist indices of 
productivity growth 
Post-privatisation productivity 
growth was around 5-6per cent 
per annum compared with 3per 
cent a year before privatisation 
  35in 1986.  However, differences 
remain in technical efficiency 
amongst British Gas’s regions. 
 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997)  Electricity generation  Various  Labour productivity has more 
than doubled since 1990, 
mainly due to shedding labour.  













Greater efficiency gains, 
meaning lower costs relative to 
output, occurred prior to 
privatisation.  
Saundry and Turnbull (1997)  Ports  Traffic and financial data 
including capital expenditure, 
mainly for the 1980s. 
The UK’s privatised ports did 
not perform better than trust 
ports and municipally-owned 
docks. Service improvements 
have came mainly from 
employment de-regulation (the 
abolition of the so-called Dock 
Labour Scheme). 
Martin and Parker (1997)  11 privatised organisations 
studied including British Gas 
and BT.  Years before and after 
privatisation included. 
Labour productivity, TFP, 
various financial ratios and data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) 
Mixed results with labour 
productivity growth evident but 
TFP growth lagging behind. 
O’Mahony (1998)  Sectors of UK economy 
including electricity, gas and 
water 
Labour productivity and TFP in 
the UK relative to US, France, 
Germany and Japan 
Productivity gap declined in 
1995 compared to 1989; but 
evidence of a closing gap from 
the 1970s except relative to 
France. 
  36Parker and Wu (1998)  UK steel industry compared to 
steel producers in 6 other 
countries. 
DEA analysis of relative input- 
output efficiency and 
productivity figures. 
A large improvement in 
relative performance occurred 
in the British steel industry 
before the privatisation. 
Privatisation was followed by a 









British Airports Authority – 
largest airport operator in the 





DEA analysis of the relative 
performance of BAA pre and 
post-privatisation and the 
relative performance of its 
individual airports compared 
with other airports in the UK 
privately and publicly owned 
No evidence that privatisation 
had a significant effect on 
performance. Performance 
improvements were a 
continuation of a longer-term 
trend. 
 
Harris, Parker and Cox (1998); 
Cox, Harris and Parker (1999) 
Procurement practices in 28 
privatised companies 
Questionnaire and case studies  Evidence of improvements in 
procurement efficiency after 
privatisation, but some firms 
progressing faster than others 
and few close to achieving best 
practice. 
Saal and Parker (2000, 2001)  Water and sewerage industry 
in England and Wales. 
Labour and total factor 
productivity and cost function. 
Privatisation led to no obvious 
rise in productivity or lowered 
costs of production. Higher 
productivity and lower unit 
costs came when the regulatory 
price caps were tightened in 
1995. 
  37Pollitt and Domah (2001)  Regional electricity companies 
in England and Wales 
Social cost-benefit analysis 
using a counterfactual 
Privatisation did yield 
significant net social benefits, 
but these were unevenly 
distributed across time and 
groups in society.   
Government gained £56m in 
sales proceeds and taxes, but 
consumers did not begin to 
gain until 2000.  Producers 
benefited from large increase 
in after-tax profits. 
Pollitt and Smith (2002)  Britain’s railways  Social cost-benefit analysis 
using a counterfactual 
Major efficiencies have been 
achieved and consumers have 
benefited from lower prices.   
Increased government subsidy 
has been largely recouped 
through privatisation proceeds.  
Output quality is not lower. 
Florio (2002)  Social cost-benefit analysis of 
UK privatisations in aggregate 
Labour and total factor 
productivity, employment, 
prices and abnormal returns to 
investors. Econometric 
analyses of structural breaks in 
GDP growth and changes in 
welfare. 
Privatisation has had no 
noticeable effects in terms of 
trends in productivity, 
employment and price levels at 
the firm or sector levels after 
allowing for changes in 
technology and input prices, 
nor on GDP growth and 
productivity at the national 
level. Overall household 
expenditure on utility services 
  38including coal and transport 
remained remarkably stable at 
around 8% of the total value of 
consumers’ expenditure: ‘Our 
overall result…..[is]… that 
taxpayers suffered a loss of 
£14bn., but this was cancelled 
out by the equivalent transfer 
to shareholders, workers’ 
welfare was probably slightly 
negatively affected, but overall 
this impact was negligible, 
consumers enjoyed a perpetual 
discount in prices worth less 
that £1,000 for each British 
citizen…. Apparently, far from 
being a “revolution”, the great 
divestiture was a reshuffling of 
relative positions of various 
agents, probably a regressive 
one, with a rather modest 
impact on aggregate economic 
efficiency’ (p.41).  
Shaoul (2003)  National Air Traffic Services 
(NATS) 
Financial analysis  The resulting PPP is not 
financially viable given 
revenues, costs and investment 
needs. 
  39Florio (2003)  BT’s long-term performance 
over 40 years 
Output, prices, revenues, costs, 
employment, productivity, 
profits and investment.  
 
The rate of growth of output 
was higher before privatisation. 
Prices fell with business users 
and international calls the 
biggest gainers. There was 
evidence of capital for labour 
substitution, while R&D 
expenditures fell as a 
percentage of turnover. 
Operating profits were stable 
before and after privatisation 
and privatisation had little 
discernible effect on 
productivity trends before 
1991, when the introduction of 
more competition and new 
regulatory pressures led to 
large gains. 
 
  40Table 4: Comparative Productivity: Electricity, gas and water sectors, 1979-95 
 
(UK = 100) 
 
 







     Total Factor 
Productivity 
 





1995        1979  1989  1995 
USA  474 
 
345 245    247  190  176 
France  238 
 
255 173    101  110  99 
Germany  202 
 
156 103    149  116  97 
Japan  180 
 
155 107    117  88  73 
 
 
























Source: Littlechild (2000, Figure 2, p.33). Note: Littlechild uses the term ‘sites’ 
instead of users. 
 




Table 6: Examples of Returns to Investors in the Privatised Utilities 
 
% Returns to investors selling after: 
 
  1 day  1 year    5 years    Still held 
at 30/4/97 
 
BT  (1)  35 84 (+69)  20 (+6)  14  (+3) 
BT  (2)  5  22 (+5)  10 (-3)  12  (-2) 
BT(3)  5 5 (-4)  - - 8  (-5) 
           



















           
RECs           
Average  23 41 (+29)  40 (+27)  38  (+25) 
           
Powergen  (1)  22 29 (+26)  30 (+19)  29  (+18) 
           
Powergen  (2)  3 9 (-14)  - - 16  (-3) 
           
National 
Power (1) 
22 22 (+19)  28 (+17)  30  (+19) 
           
National 
Power (2) 




1. Figures in parentheses show gains relative to movement of the FT- All Share Index 
over the same period. Returns are to individuals investing and are calculated as 
internal rates of return. Due to special incentive schemes the return to institutional 
investors is slightly lower. 
2. All returns are real returns deflated using the RPI 
3. 1 day return is an absolute IRR (not annualised).  It shows the gain from first day’s 
trading on the selling price.  All other periods reflect annualised returns. 
4. The lower first day returns on second and third tranches of shares sold reflect the 
fact that later issues are priced close to the current market price. 
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